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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that data modeling for information systems cannot be
divorced from human perception, and is therefore marked by the subtle and often
unconscious vagaries of cognition. In the absence of a formal semantics for
modeling languages, this can result in models that are subjective, ambiguous,
and difficult to interpret. Philosophical ontologies that provide a taxonomy of
elements in the world have been proposed as a foundation to ground the symbols
in various notational systems. Contrary to this view we show that models
represent a designer’s psychological perception of the world rather than some
idealized, philosophical description of that world. A precise ontology of cognitive
perceptions is therefore more relevant for the design of diagrammatic notations
for use in documenting and unambiguously communicating the analysis of a
domain.

INTRODUCTION
This paper reports an experiment which
attempts to uncover some deep, universal
principles of cognition that can have some
impact on the way information systems are
perceived and modeled. We focus on analysis
models, which represent the current or
imagined structure of an information system.
These models are supposed to capture a high
level, human centered abstraction of the
problem domain and are often constructed by
teams of analysts consulting with domain

experts. As such they must be as transparent as
possible to interpretation, not only to
unambiguously capture the intended analysis
but also to enable interaction and mutual
understanding
between
the
various
stakeholders. To that end, (Hitchman 2003)
argues that an important role for data models is
in facilitating interaction between analysts,
serving as a structured language for
communication about the domain. He points
out the importance of considering the
linguistic foundations for modeling languages,
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in aid of this function.
Clearly
the
modeling process involves a great deal of
psychology. It is our contention in this paper
that the empirical study of psychological
factors is therefore necessary if we are to make
generalizations about the way models reflect
the “real world” systems that are analyzed and
built. We argue that notational systems, or
visual modeling languages, should be
constructed in a way that complies with our
perceptions of reality. This will lead to
notations that are more intuitive and less error
prone.
It should be noted that our interest in
modeling is centered on its use for
communication during the analysis phase,
encompassing the requirement that the final
product is clearly and unambiguously
documented for external parties. The model
should seem a “natural” representation to
analysts and designers alike. We will, however,
deny the notion that “the world” imposes rules
on the model such that there is a prescribed,
correct representation of situations: as most
readers will attest from their experience, there
are often many different views of any situation,
and many equally valid solutions to a problem.
Instead we argue that the proper source for
modeling constraints is perception. The
fundamental structure of all complementary
solutions is imposed by underlying
psychological representations which give rise
to our perceptions and provide the flexibility
needed to accommodate multiple world views.
An opposite view is held by the
currently dominant approach to the study of
the foundations and “proper use” of modeling
languages. The received view involves the use
of philosophical ontologies (e.g. Wand and
Weber, 1995; Shanks, Tansley and Weber,
2003), where ontology is taken to be a branch
of philosophy that deals with the description of
reality:
Ontology, understood as a branch of
metaphysics, is the science of being in
general, embracing such issues as the
nature of existence and the categorical
structure of reality. (Honderich 1995, p.
634)
Note that this differs from the sense of
ontology that is typically meant in the research
on domain ontologies developed for semantic
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interoperability in computer science (e.g.
Staab and Studer 2004). Such ontologies may
be influenced by philosophical analyses, but
are typically seen more as an engineering
exercise. The premise for using philosophical
ontologies as a foundation for analysis is that
modeling notations should be designed in a
way that establishes some form of
isomorphism between the notation and the
ontologically analyzed structure of the world.
The argument goes something like this: when
we do conceptual modeling we do so because
we want to capture some significant portions
of a domain of interest. But the domain of
interest has some fixed, invariant properties by
virtue of being part of the "world at large", and
we already know a great deal about the "world
at large" through the hard work of
philosophical ontological analysis. Ipso facto,

CONTRIBUTION
This paper contributes to the field of IS
in terms of both methodology and practical
application. Concerning methodology we show
that traditional and rigorous experimental
techniques from cognitive psychology can be
applied in information systems research. We
argue that, since cognition underlies all
complex behavior, traditional methods of
cognitive research should be employed in
developing best practices for IS. We
demonstrate that such a rigorous psychological
approach can benefit the design of modeling
languages.
On the practical side we consider the
modeling of ternary relationships, and show
psychologically based difficulties in treating
all such relationships as formally equivalent.
Such equivalence is assumed by current
modeling languages as well as prescriptive
philosophical models. We propose a new
notation for handling at least some scenarios.
Our findings will be interesting to
researchers interested in domain modeling and
formal foundations for information systems. It
will also be interesting to practitioners
interested in the way that sub conscious
cognitive factors can affect the way situations
are perceived and modeled. The methods
introduced here open a new area of inquiry
into the way that minds, models, and the world
interact in information systems analysis.
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the ontological analysis should inform the
practice of conceptual modeling. Thus,
modeling notation will more accurately reflect
real world domains, and be more
unambiguously interpreted if it is constructed
such that it conforms to the structure of the
world as seen through the philosophical
ontology. In addition, it is claimed that an
ontological alignment between the world and
the model can be used to selected modeling
languages that are maximally suitable for a
given domain and task, as well as help in
validating models with stakeholders (Shanks,
Tansley and Weber 2003).
However, (Veres and Hitchman 2002)
challenged this general approach. They argued
that claims about the intuitiveness of modeling
languages constructed by such principles were
based on a hidden assumption about
psychology. That is, the assumption behind the
claim that an “ontologically correct” modeling
language will be intuitive is that people's
cognition is also “ontologically correct” at
some level: if our models represent reality the
way it “really is”, then people will find this a
natural representation. But this is surely an
empirical claim, and should not appear as an
assumption. It must be shown that the formal
prescriptions that are derived as hypotheses
from philosophical analyses of “the world” do
in fact help make sense of the fragments of the
world involved in modeling scenarios. It is
precisely our claim that in general this is not
the case and a psychological analysis will do
better. Of course, there will be cases in which
both analyses agree, and these are
uninteresting for purposes of hypothesis
testing. For example, it would be odd if some
analysis of the world concluded that there
were no objects in the world. Our
psychological theory therefore serves a
secondary role in providing an alternative
hypothesis that can be used in deciding the
relevant test cases for deciding on the
usefulness of the philosophical and
psychological models.
Before we can devise a test case we
consider a concrete example of the sort of
prescriptions the philosophical stance makes,
concerning an entity relationship (ER) model
(Chen. 1976). The basic ER model uses a
relatively simple set of constructs, which
enable designers to specify the structure of

databases. The primary goal is to capture
information about significant elements in a
domain, and the relationships between the
elements. But despite this relative simplicity,
(Wand, Storey, and Weber 1999) stipulate that
there is an inherent confusion about the way
the relationship construct is used in practice.
For instance modelers are often unclear about
whether a concept should be represented by an
entity or a relationship between entities. For
instance if we want to model the fact that
students are registered at Universities, we have
at least two choices. We could create separate
entities for “student” and “university”, and a
“registered_at” (or some similar suitable label)
relationship between the two. Alternatively,
one could draw “registration” as an entity in its
own right, such that “university” and “student”
both have a relationship with “registration”.
Such ambiguities, it is claimed, can result in
models that fail to accurately represent the
domain and can lead to errors in the
interpretation of the model.
Wand, Storey, and Weber (1999) argue
that the proper way to resolve these difficulties
is by restricting the meaning of notational
elements with the use of formal ontologies.
Specifically, they argue that an ontology based
on the work of Mario Bunge (e.g. Bunge, 1977)
reflects the structure of "the world" with
sufficient accuracy to be useful in defining the
use of modeling constructs. They devise a
number
of
rules
(prescriptions
and
proscriptions) that modelers should abide by,
as well as propose a number of new notations
that reflect the structure of the world with
more accuracy than currently available
constructs. They argue that concepts like
registration, and assignment are "really”
mutual properties that hold between the two
primary actors in the relationship (e.g. a
University and a Student both have the mutual
property registration which depends on a
relationship between the two). The
prescription is that mutual properties have to
be modeled as relationships, since entities
should only be used to model things and not
mutual properties. This avoids construct
overload (where the one modeling symbol
represents both things and mutual properties)
and therefore confusion.
On the extreme reading the criticism is
quite severe: “In short, the theory underlying
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the nature of and representation of
relationships in conceptual modeling is unclear
and in our view, problems arise with
relationships in conceptual modeling because
their nature and underlying meaning are
unclear”. (Wand, Storey, and Weber 1999, pp.
495-496). In other words, the meaning of the
most fundamental constructs in the ER model
are ill defined. But (Hitchman 2003) points out
that practitioners have little trouble conceiving
of many concepts as either entities or
relationships during a modeling session. They
do not appear confused by the choice, and in
fact, use it to arrive at the most parsimonious
and cost effective solution. The criticism
therefore seems more realistic if construed
instead as a problem of consistency in which
different modelers represent the same concept
through a different choice of notation (we are
indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this
point). A well defined semantics is therefore
necessary insofar as it can improve
consistency.
Up to this point we have argued against
the received view, noting that practice seems
to militate against theory on the point of fixing
the semantics of entities according to (a
specific case of) philosophical ontology. But
we also suggested that the human cognitive
architecture imposes fundamental constraints
on our representations. Surely this ought to
result in some prescriptions on the
representation of entities, based on psychology?
In order to answer this question it is necessary
to delve a little into the world of psychology
and linguistics.
The Role of Psychological Ontology
The present aim is to investigate the
way humans perceive abstract entities and
their relationships, and to show that these
perceptions can guide modeling decisions. On
the one hand this goal sounds ridiculously
simple minded. Of course we model
perceptions. What else would we model? We
are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for
pointing out that the important role of
cognition is widely accepted in the IS
community, and does not need to be defended.
But, while we are relieved by this observation,
we note that wholesale claims about the
importance of “cognition” is only half the
answer. The real questions about the precise
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character of that perception are yet to be
tackled. No one doubts the importance of
cognition, but fewer are in a position to make
substantive claims about the precise way in
which cognition and modeling interact. (Wand,
Storey, and Weber 1999), for example would
not deny that we model perceptions of reality,
but they would then suggest (without direct
psychological evidence we might add) that
those perceptions are in some sense
underdetermined, vague, and sometimes
confused. This is why we need some external
guidance, on their account. But instead of
relegating perceptions to the status of
important but unexplored citizens, in this
paper we try to provide a psychologically
motivated ontology that describes precisely the
way in which perceptions of abstract entities
are formed. This will then tell us why
ambiguities might arise, what the boundaries
of that indeterminacy are, and how to best
cope with it. We believe that legislating a
solution to uncertainty with recourse to
philosophical analysis is not helpful if we want
to understand and assist human interpretation
and communication. It is not enough to say
that our perceptions are confused and fix them
with some external frame of reference. We
need to know why they are confused, and see if
we can “fix” the problem without such
external assistance.
The
linguist
Ray
Jackendoff
(Jackendoff 1983,1990,1997) has taken
observations about the correspondence
between language, vision and other modalities,
and developed a detailed formal description of
conceptual structure that can be used to
account for a large number of observed facts
concerning the syntax to semantics mapping in
natural language. This allows us to describe an
ontology of conceptual structure that we can
subsequently use to make predictions about
modeling practice.
Jackendoff
(1983)
argues
that
properties of conceptual structures can be
conjectured from their interactions with
linguistic (syntactic) structures. As a result we
can use the large number of existing empirical
observations from syntactic theory to generate
hypotheses concerning the nature of
conceptual structures. In other words, the
highly influential and well articulated
theoretical constructs from syntactic theory in
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the Chomskian tradition can be brought to bear
on the analysis of conceptual structures. An
obvious but important observation is that the
conceptual structures themselves are not
language dependent, and they are not
determined by language use. Quite the
contrary; language evolved as a way to
externalize the pre existing content of
cognition for the purpose of communication
(Pinker and Bloom 1990). Thus we gain
insight into concepts by observing the
correspondences between structural properties
of language and conceptual structure. This is
not to claim that the two are equivalent; clearly
language has properties that would make no
sense in the conceptual domain, and vice versa.
Jackendoff stipulates that conceptual
structures can be described by a small number
of basic ontological categories which form the
major conceptual categories. These are the
semantic "parts of speech" that parallel the
status of verbs, nouns, etc. in syntax. We can
consequently specify a number of mapping
rules between syntactic and conceptual
constituents, which clarifies both the
relationship between linguistic and conceptual
structures, and the nature of those structures
themselves.
Jackendoff (1983, 1990) presents
linguistic evidence for the identity of the
conceptual constituents, and suggests some
relatively “standard” categories like [STATE]
and [EVENT], but also some novel ones like
[PATH] and [AMOUNT]. He further notices
that many of the rules and transformations of
conceptual
structure
can
be
stated
independently of the identity of the constituent.
Thus, he observes the standard practice of a
[PROPERTY] modifying an [OBJECT], (e.g.
red dog), but then notes that a [PROPERTY]
can modify an [EVENT] in the same way (e.g.
long war), and that a [PROPERTY] can even
modify a [PATH] (e.g. a long way past my
house). The importance of this is that, while no
conceptual constituent can be reduced to
another, they can be treated as equivalent for
certain operations. To see how this helps our
understanding of modeling, consider the
previous example concerning university
registrations.
On
the
“registration”
interpretation (where registration is an entity),
the model describes a unique [EVENT] or
[ACTION] that has taken place, involving a

university and a student. This [EVENT] is
modified by additional [PROPERTY] concepts
like “date”, “office_location” and so on. The
end result of the registration is modeled as an
entity with relevant attributes. The model
which contains the “registered_at” relationship
between a “university” entity and a “student”
entity describes a [STATE] or perhaps
[PROPERTY]. Two observations are relevant.
First, the choice of representation in the model
can be explained by the presence of the simple
ambiguity in the reading of the term
“registration”. Both readings are possible
because conceptual structures can treat both
readings on equal terms. The second
observation concerns concept overload in the
ER notation. There is a many to one mapping
from conceptual structures to ER notation:
[OBJECT], [EVENT], etc., are all mapped to
an entity. This is the same point made by
(Shanks, Tansley and Weber 2003), who point
out the problem of construct overload where,
for instance “... a thing and an event both have
to be represented by the same grammatical
construct (such as an entity symbol)” p.87. But
the psychological explanation shows that some
conflations are not necessarily harmful if they
are based on the content free rules of
conceptual structure. But to the extent that this
is a problem, our argument stands, that
conflation involving universally perceived
psychological perceptions of the world is more
noteworthy of attention than conflation with
respect to a prescriptive analysis of “the
world”. A topic for further research is to
identify which categories are conflated in
which ER expression, and to see if this causes
difficulties in given situations?
We will not delve further into the
technical details of Jackendoff's theory in this
paper. Instead in what follows we use the
theory of syntax-semantics correspondences to
derive a hypothesis about the representation of
certain situations.
Consider the linguistic (syntactic)
distinction between complements and adjuncts.
Basically, they both involve the way
information might be added to a sentence.
Consider the following examples:
1) Sarah robs the 7-11 in New York.
2) Adam robs in Washington in February.
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The basic premise in both sentences is
that someone commits a robbery. We add
information about what, and where these
robberies took place. But if we construct a
syntactic tree for these sentences we will see
that robs and 7-11 in sentence 1. are more
closely linked than are robs and Washington in
sentence 2. This distinction has certain
consequences for the ways in which the
sentences can be transformed, as the following
examples show (where * denotes an
ungrammatical string, and the addition to the
original sentence is shown in courier).
3) Sarah robs the 7-11 in New York
everyday.
4) *Sarah robs every day the 7-11 in
New York.
5) Sarah robs/*eats/*marries/*sleeps
the 7-11 in New York.
6) Adam robs in Washington in February
when it is warm.
7) Adam robs when it is warm in
Washington in February.

8) Adam robs/eats/marries/sleeps
in Washington.
Sentences 3. and 6. simply add an
additional phrase to the sentence, with no
ensuing difficulties. But look what happens
when we try to move the newly introduced
phrase in sentences 4. and 7. The move seems
fine in 7., but not in 4 which now becomes
ungrammatical. The phrasal structure of the
sentence won't allow the movement, because
the phrase the 7-11 is too closely bonded to the
verb. We say that 7-11 is a complement of the
verb robs, whereas in Washington is a less
closely linked adjunct. Sentences 5. and 8.
further show that a verb is quite selective in
the complements it will take, but insensitive to
its adjuncts.
But how is this distinction reflected in
conceptual
structure?
Following
a
lexical/conceptual correspondence rule from
(Jackendoff 1990) it can be shown that the
complement is directly linked to the verb in
conceptual structure. On the other hand
adjuncts are mapped into some lower position
in the recursive definition. The end result is
that grammatical subjects and the verbal
complement are more closely related in
98

conceptual structure than are the subject and
adjuncts, or for that matter the complements
and adjuncts. By hypothesis, there are
syntactic and conceptual differences between
the entities involved in sentences 1. and 2.
So how does this let us make
predictions about conceptual modeling?
Suppose we were designing a database (for a
police application perhaps) that recorded the
incidence of robberies, and contained
information such as that expressed in
sentences 1 and 2. Taken together, the
sentences contain information about people,
locations, establishments, and months of the
year (time periods). For students of
introductory database modeling (we will have
more to say about choice of subjects later), this
would constitute the distinct entities: Person,
Location, Establishment, Time_period. Each
entity would have the capacity to store the
provided information (name) for each entity,
as well as any additional information. Person
could have social security number, last known
address, etc. Location could have city name,
country of location, postal/zip code,
population, etc. Establishment could have
name, type, opening hours, etc. Time_period
could have month, year, day, list of holidays,
etc. If we considered the relationships in terms
of a simple conceptual model, the situations in
1) and 2) both describe a ternary relationship
between three entities: person-establishmentlocation or person-location-time_period. And,
as (Wand, Storey, and Weber 1999) suggest,
all n-ary relationships should be modeled alike.
However, we have shown that a conceptual
analysis shows that the two scenarios have
subtly different underlying representations.
Are the two n-ary relationships not alike, after
all? The following experiment was designed to
test if the previously discussed conceptual
difference has any impact on concept
modeling, by introducing a modeling symbol
that provides an opportunity to model some
relationships more faithfully according to the
psychological ontology. We investigate if
people tend to prefer the conceptually faithful
representation in the appropriate situations.
Psychology Experiments and the Real
World
In what follows, we will propose a new
notational symbol and contrast it with UML to
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see how it is used to model scenarios involving
ternary relationships. We aim to show that the
Bunge-Wand-Webber approach (e.g. Wand
and Webber, 1989; 1990; 1993; 1995), which
has received considerable coverage in the
literature, makes the wrong prediction when
applying their guidelines. This calls into
question their theoretical claims, on empirical
grounds.
Our subjects were all undergraduate
students studying systems analysis and design.
The use of students for modeling experiments
can be questioned (e.g. Hitchman, 2003 and
references therein) on the grounds that it is
unrealistic for practitioner related problems.
There is also a related feeling that experiments
in this field should employ tasks that mirror as
closely as possible those that users are
required to perform in practice. On this general
view the experiment we will describe in this
paper seems somewhat strange and unnatural.
In our defense we remind the reader
that our aim is to employ a well controlled
experimental task as a way to isolate
psychologically salient components of the
analysis process. We are interested in probing
unconscious cognitive variables which we
claim have a strong and general consequence
on the mental behavior of students and
practitioners alike. Tasks which are performed
as part of one's everyday duties may be
unsuitable for this purpose because they are
likely to be contaminated by conscious
strategy and the idiosyncrasies that come from
long term individual experience. Practitioners
are therefore likely to have learned strategies
that obscure the very facts we wish to learn
about. Ironically, a “realistic task” might be
the worst one to use for the purposes of
discovering the underlying facts about
modeling. But what sort of task could probe
such hidden variables? A great deal of the
creative skill in cognitive psychology involves
the invention of tasks that manage to tap the
hidden processes responsible for behavior. As
an example, some of the most illuminating
paradigms in cognitive psychology involve
tasks that give no subjective clues whatever to
questions under investigation.
(Swinney,
Onifer, Prather, and Hirshkowitz 1979) asked
people to simply listen to sentences and to
make a lexical decision (word / nonword
decision) to a visually presented stimulus

(word or pseudoword, e.g. help or selp) at
some random point in the sentence.
Unbeknownst to his subjects, they were
actually involved in a cross modal priming
experiment that used lexical decision latencies
to investigate the activation of multiple senses
of ambiguous words. The subtle connection
between the auditory and the visual stimulus
was completely unknown to the subjects.
Going one step further, (Forster and Davis
1984) used masked primes that were
completely
unavailable
to
conscious
perception in their experiments on word
recognition. They argued that subjects should
have no conscious awareness of the prime, and
showed the important consequences of
ensuring that conscious, strategic factors were
eliminated in task performance. Experimental
performance was thereby controlled by a
stimulus that was completely unavailable for
conscious report. In the current experiment we
also hope to minimize conscious strategic
factors by using a task that is not obviously
related to the purpose of the hypothesis under
investigation, and subjects who are not
affected by years of experience with a
particular modeling tradition.

EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND
PROCEDURE
The design of the experiment consisted
of two sets of sentences: one set included a
verbal complement and an adjunct, while the
other set contained two adjuncts. By
hypothesis the subject and the complement in
the first set form a close conceptual
relationship, with the remaining adjunct being
distantly related to both. The second set
contained only the distantly related adjuncts.
There were ten verbs tested in each condition.
As the example sentences 1 and 2 show, some
verbs can take complements optionally; thus
many verbs appeared in both conditions. We
thought this was a favorable circumstance
since it diminished the variability between the
two sets in terms of the actual verbs used.
Most items were of this sort.
For each of the chosen verbs, six
specific examples and one generic description
were constructed. For example, the generic
sentences for 1. and 2. above were:
9) Person robs establishment in city.
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10) Person robs location at time.
The materials were counterbalanced, so
each particular example appeared with the old
notation for some participants and with the
new notation for others. The results for this
manipulation were combined in the final
analysis. We collected data from 23
participants, who were required to perform a
modeling task on the generic sentences.
Specific examples of the generic sentence
were provided for clarification.
The modeling task itself introduced the
new notation, and asked participants to choose
between a standard and the new notation for
each example. The new notation was designed
to reflect the conceptual relationships between
entities as explicitly as possible. Figure 1.
shows an example of the UML and new
notation for a complement - adjunct sentence.
Note that the new notation highlights
the close relationship between Person and
Establishment, and shows that these are further
modified by the adjunct, City.
In each example, participants were
shown a generic sentence, six specific example
sentences, and were given a choice of the two
notations. They were simply asked to choose
the model they preferred for the situations
described. From a theoretical point of view,
the new notation reflects the conceptual
relations for sentences with an initial
complement, and so it should be preferred in
this condition only.

Once the participants had finished their
task they were given grammaticality tests on
sentences of the type shown in 3 – 8 above.
This was to confirm the experimenters'
intuitions about the grammatical status of the
examples, as well as to ensure that the
judgments were shared by the participants
themselves. If the participants did not agree
with our judgments then it is possible that the
conditions were not as well dichotomized as
hoped (e.g. some complements may have been
adjuncts).
Results
The results were straightforward.
Figure 2. shows the total number of
preferences for the four conditions. The first
two bars show the preferences for sentences in
which both modifiers were adjuncts, while the
second two show the condition where the first
modifier was a complement. The first bar in
each pair shows the preference for the new
notation while the second bar shows the
preference for the standard UML type notation.
A chi-square test for independence revealed
that the sentence type and notation were not
independent in determining preference. There
was a disproportionate preference for the new
notation for complement-adjunct sentences:
Chi-square = 10.23, p < 0.01. As expected,
people preferred the conceptually faithful
notation for sentences where the first modifier
was a complement. By hypothesis, this is the
situation which is accurately reflected in the
new notation.

Figure 1. Conceptual notation for ternary relationship using the new notation (on top) and
a UML diagram.. Establishment is the complement and city is the adjunct in the example.
100
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Figure 2. Total number of preferences for each sentence type.
While the results are quite clear, it is
possible that the magnitude of the interaction
was in fact obscured in this particular study if
subjects’ intuitions about the grammatical
status of the arguments differed from our own.
In an additional analysis we correlated the
subjects' mean agreement about the
grammaticality of the test sentences with the
difference in preference, for each sentence,
between the two notations. We found a
significant correlation for that sub set of
sentences that contained two adjuncts,
Pearson's R=-0.46, P < 0.05. The lower the
subjects' agreement (i.e. the less clear the
status of the adjuncts), the bigger the
difference in preference. In other words, the
slight numerical preference for the new
notation in the adjunct-adjunct condition may
be because some sentences are judged to be
complement-adjunct. This difference might
disappear altogether if the sentences are
selected with maximal subject agreement in

mind. This would make the result even more
dramatic.
Discussion
The experiment shows that a subtle
grammatical difference in sentence structure
can influence the preference for the way a
scenario is modeled. But our argument is that
it is not the language itself that determines
modeling preference but the underlying
conceptual structures, demonstrating that
people do look at ternary relationships in
different ways, contrary to the (Wand, Storey
and Weber 1999) prescription. This is taken as
evidence against the particular philosophical
ontology.
This finding is important since it
supports our view that cognitive factors, as
seen through language structure, determine
subtle aspects of modeling. This view
complements Hitchman's observations that an
important role of conceptual models is in
facilitating interaction through discussion
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about the problem and its solution. The model
itself becomes a language that is used in
discussing the problem. (Hitchman 2003)
argues that the role of a model as an
independent conceptual model is less
important than its role in interaction:
“Practitioners talk with the notation as well as
using the notation to draw a diagram. The
entity-relationship model constrains the social
interaction because the model provides a way
of talking about design. The practitioners use
the model to talk about a normalized
relational data structure in a way that
undermines the idea of the entity-relationship
model as an independent conceptual model.”
But if this is true, then it is doubly important
that the modeling tool works “with” and not
“against” the practitioners' conceptual
understanding. A notation based on a formal
ontology of the world would require the
practitioners to constrain their dialogue
according to the concepts in that ontology. A
notation based on conceptual structures would
liberate the dialogue and allow the expression
of the practitioners' conceptual understanding.
The suggestion we are making is that
“conceptual modeling” languages should
really be conceptual modeling languages in
that their design should respect the properties
of the cognitive architecture of their users.
In light of the importance of the finding,
we address several criticisms that might be
leveled at the reported experiment. First, the
choice of task might be called into question.
We have already mentioned our motivation for
using a task that did not obviously reveal the
hypothesis under investigation. By asking
subjects simply for their preference, we did not
draw attention to the fact that we were really
interested in the way the models related to the
meanings expressed in the sentences.
Nevertheless, a further criticism may be that
subjects were not given sufficient direction,
and therefore the precise research question was
not really addressed. We concede that there is
no way, in general, to know with certainty how
people solve a problem they are given. But
that is why we do cognitive science: we find
tasks where reliable differences exist between
conditions, and hypothesize an explanation for
the behavioral difference. The hypothesis is
then tested. Here, we have shown such a
difference, and provided such an explanation.
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Any worthwhile criticism of the task owes us
an alternative explanation for the significant
interaction. As an additional defense, an open
ended task such as this stands the further risk
of obscuring effects that might otherwise be
detected. The fact that we found a significant
result is therefore doubly worthy of note.
A further criticism might involve the
choice of items. It might, for instance, be
proposed that the status of certain entities in
the scenarios might be different from others.
For instance time_period might be better
thought of as an attribute than an entity, so
sentences involving a time_period should not
be modeled with three entities at all. But there
are two reasons why this criticism of the
experiment is not valid. First, none of the
subjects complained on this point at post
experiment
debriefing
sessions
which
indicated that the scenarios posed no special
difficulty. Second and more importantly, the
experimental result itself mitigates the critique.
It must be remembered that every sentence is
presented with a choice of “new” or “old”
notation, and subjects are asked to indicate
their preference. If there was a fundamental
problem with any of the scenarios then this
should affect both models. Yet again, the
significant interaction does emerge. The
question then becomes, if neither model makes
sense, why do people tend to prefer one model
over the other?
It might finally be noted that (Kent
1978) points out that it is possible to
conceptualize ternary relationships as two
binary relationships. Thus, a relationship
between ABC can be seen as A(BC) or (AB)C.
This is similar to our finding, suggesting the
possibility that the notation simply models this
observation. But, he goes on to remark, as a
true "formalist" would, that generally there is
nothing to decide between the groupings on
formal grounds and each is as sensible as the
other. But of course the hypotheses presented
in this paper give strong reasons to prefer one
over the other. Psychology provides principles
missing in logic alone. To follow this up, we
plan to run the experiment again, but rearranging the grouping. According to the
psychological hypothesis, people should not
prefer the new notation if it groups concepts
contrary to conceptual structures.

Cognition and Modeling: Foundations for Research and Practice

In summary, the work has demonstrated
that real world modeling practices can be
informed by a deep understanding of cognitive
facts. Initially this forces us to consider the
way we think about ternary relationships.
Future work will involve finding more support
for a psychological rather than philosophical
basis for modeling languages. Given continued
success, we will be able to use the lessons
learned in an attempt to find a proper
grounding for IS modeling languages. One
area of particular interest is in the modeling of
workflows in knowledge intensive enterprises.
Current approaches are limited in their lack of
flexibility and ability to incorporate the
various social and cognitive facts that are

involved in such tasks (Joergensen, 2004). But
once again, (Jackendoff 1992, 1993, 1999)
offer detailed analyses of the conceptual
structures that underpin behaviors involved
with transfer of property, rights and
obligations, and other complex social and
behavioral activities. We are currently
investigating the use of these analyses as a
way to inform modeling in the larger sociocognitive setting. This will bring the relevance
of the findings into a significantly larger arena.
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